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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The stop, detention and arrest of the Defendant in this case 
was clearly unlawful since the stopping and arresting officer did 
not have reasonable suspicion that Mr. Erickson had violated the 
law nor did he have probable cause to believe that Mr. Erickson had 
violated the law, and therefore the trial Judge's ruling that the 
Motion to Suppress should be denied should be reversed* Defendant 
followed the procedures with regards to the Motion. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I 
WHETHER OFFICER MITCHELL HAD REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION 
TO STOP DON LAVON ERICKSON ON AUGUST 4, 1988? 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) established the standard for 
investigatory stops. This Standard was codified and adopted by our 
1 
Utah Legislature in Utah Code Annotated § 77-7-15. Both the courts 
and the legislature have established and recognized the standard 
that an officer must have in order to stop an individual for 
investigatory purposes. They have both established that an officer 
must have reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual has 
committed or is in the act of committing a crime. This reasonable 
suspicion must be individualized, that is, directed at this suspect 
or individual at this time. The reasonable suspicion must be 
articulable. The officer must be able to articulate to others just 
what this reasonable suspicion is. This Court in State v. 
Baumgaertel, 762 P.2d 2 (Utah App. 1988) stated: 
To justify an "investigatory stop" or 
"seizure" that falls short of an official 
arrest, a peace officer "must point to 
specific, articulable facts which together 
with rational inferences drawn from those 
facts, would lead a reasonable person to 
conclude (the suspect) had committed or was 
about to commit a crime. 
The facts in this case do not support a rational inference 
that Mr. Erickson had committed or was about to commit a crime. 
The testimony of Deputy Mitchell establish that without a doubt. 
The following exchange of question and answer which took place at 
the hearing on the Motion to Suppress remove any question that 
Deputy Mitchell did not suspect that Mr. Erickson had violated any 
laws: 
Q. What was it about the occupant of this 
vehicle (Mr. Erickson) that led you to believe 
that he had broken the law? 
A. There wasn't anything about the occupant. 
It was the description of the vehicle and 
where he was at the time. (See Motion to 
Suppress Transcript Page 14, hereafter MTS p. 
14). 
The prosecution argues that based upon the description of the 
vehicle that the officers were authorized to stop any vehicle 
fitting the most general of descriptions (MTS p. 11). They also 
try to bring Rudy Monson's observation of the vehicle to the point 
where it is the same vehicle as observed by Deputy Mitchell 
(Respondent's Brief page 8). However Rudy Monsen was clear in his 
testimony. He was ready to follow one vehicle with clearance 
lights when he heard subsequent information which led him to 
believe he was going the wrong direction. He then headed out in 
the direction of the alleged offense (T. p. 87-88). When Rudy 
Monsen was responding to the alleged altercation he observed a 
vehicle of similar appearances and similar location, however, 
prudently after receiving additional information from the 
dispatcher chose not to pursue the vehicle any further (See Trial 
Transcript Page 87-88, hereafter T. p. 87-88). The prime fact to 
be drawn from this is, the fact that there were an unknown number 
of vehicles in the area (rural as it may be) which fit this very 
generic and nondescript description. Had there been a color of 
the vehicle that may have been something else. 
Deputy Mitchell, attempted to convey to the Court that he was 
intimately familiar with all of the vehicles owned by all of the 
residents in the area (MTS p. 14-15). On further examination 
though the area fed by the road upon which Deputy Mitchell observed 
Mr. Erickson was so expansive that he did not know all of the 
3 
people in the area (see MTS p. 33-34). With his knowledge of the 
area and the vague description of the vehicle he conceded that it 
could have been anyone coming from that area (MTS p. 34). Based 
upon Deputy Mitchell's experience, knowledge and understanding at 
that time, he had no basis to reasonably believe that Mr. Erickson 
or any other occupant of the vehicle had violated any laws or was 
about to violate any laws. 
ISSUE II 
WHETHER OFFICER MITCHELL HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST DON 
LAVON ERICKSON FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL ON AUGUST 
4, 1988? 
After explaining what the State feels is sufficient probable 
cause to arrest Mr. Erickson they go on to say, "Some of these 
facts may be explained if Erickson had said someone at the fight 
scene had threatened him. But that was not the case..." 
(Respondent's Brief p. 10). The State chooses to ignore the very 
facts as outlined in their own brief! In Respondent's Brief they 
outline the facts they feel are salient for consideration by this 
Court in arriving at a decision (Respondent's Brief P.2-6). The 
State's argument overlooks facts numbered 11 and 13 from their own 
brief. These facts state as follows: 
11. Mitchell pulled over the truck at 
approximately 9:35 p.m. because it matched the 
description given by the dispatcher and 
because it was coming from the direction of 
the fight scene (emphasis added). 
13. Erickson confirmed that he had been at the 
scene of the fight and stated that "Johnny and 
Arnold were over there shooting shot guns at 
each other"(emphasis added), (see Respondent's 
Brief p. 4). 
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The distinction between being "threatened" and being at a "fight 
scene" where people are "shooting shot guns at each other" is a 
distinction without a difference. Even drawing on Deputy 
Mitchell's 13 years of experience it would be difficult at best to 
understand or find the basis for probable cause to arrest Mr, 
Erickson for Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol. 
Probable cause is not a hunch, it must be articulable and 
demonstrative. At no point did the State or Deputy Mitchell 
attempt to explain the basis for the arrest past "...his speech was 
careful,like he was trying to, you know, carefully enunciate his 
words.", "His breathing was heavy", and "his actions appeared like 
he was trying to control them.". Deputy Mitchell observed Mr. 
Erickson get out of his own vehicle and walk towards the deputy's 
vehicle. He observed nothing unusual about his walking or stance 
at that time. Indeed, Deputy Mitchell had just pulled, head on, 
in front of Mr. Erickson. Mr. Erickson brought his vehicle to a 
stop, without incident, in spite of the apparent shock of seeing 
an oncoming car leave it's lane and stop in front of him in his 
lane. Deputy Mitchell is describing many individuals who 
infrequently come in contact with the police. He is describing an 
individual who has just watched people shooting shot guns at each 
other. Or perhaps an individual who had just been run off the 
road by an on coming vehicle in his lane. He is describing 
something most ordinary and trying to drum up probable cause to 
justify an illegal arrest. 
ISSUE III B. 
5 
WHETHER ERICKSON FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE RULES WITH REGARDS 
TO MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS? 
This point is nothing more than a "red herring" intended to 
distract this Court from the weightier matters involved herein. 
The State would have this Court believe that they objected to 
the form of defendant's motion at the time of trial. A close 
reading of the transcript attendant that hearing would show facts 
to the contrary. The exchange between the Court, the Prosecution 
and the Defense was not as to any objection as to procedure or form 
of the Motion but rather as to who was to go forward with the 
hearing. The State didn't feel that it had sufficient facts to 
proceed on the Motion and thus wanted the defense to proceed which 
the defense did. As far as raising the Motion to Suppress at the 
time of trial it was well with in the scope of appropriate 
procedures. The Motion must be raised 5 days prior to the time of 
trial (see Utah Code Annotated S 77-35-12). This was complied with 
in this case. The Rules relied on in Respondent's brief (see 
Respondent's Brief p. 13) were not applicable at the time of either 
the Hearing or the Trial. They had been superceded by the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration. Mr. Erickson did comply with the 
rules and as such this is a frivolous argument based on out dated 
rules. No objection to proceeding with the hearing was made by the 
State at the time of the hearing and it can not be raised for the 
first time on appeal. The State effectively waived any objection 




This is a clear case of the officer on the street abusing his 
discretion. He did not possess the individualized, particularized 
reasonable suspicion requisite for a routine traffic or 
investigatory stop. He did not possess the requisite probable 
cause to arrest Mr. Erickson. The Judges ruling that the 
defendant's Motion to Suppress should not be granted was clearly 
erroneous. The trial court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this J day of March 1990. 
D. Bruce Oliver 
Oliver and Parker P.C. 
180 South 300 West, Suite 260 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing this 
^x day of March, 1990, to: Herbert Wm. Gillespie, County 
Attorney, P. O. Box 206, Duchesne, Utah 84021; Roland Uresk and 
Machelle Fitzgerald, 156 North 200 East, Roosevelt, Utah 84066. 
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1 the speed limitf but not at a — 
2 fc I don't mean to characterize it as one thing or 
3 another; but you were responding as quickly as you could? 
4 A As quickly as possible, yes. 
5 Q And tell us what you first observed that you found 
6 1 to be unusual that evening, that prompted your contact with 
7 Mr* i^rickson? 
8 A Well, first of all, I was advised by the 
9 dispatcher that the complainant had called and identified 
10 one of the parties to the incident, had left the scene 
n driving a pickup, they described the pickup. And my first 
12 contact with Mr. Erickson was when I observed him coming 
13 towards me in the pickup that was described to me. At that 
14 time, 1 pulled him over. 
15 U What was the description that you received? 
16 I A It was a — t h e description was that it was a long-
17 wheelbase, two-wheel drive pickup, had clearance lights on 
t8 top of the cab and that it was heading north from the 
19 residence. 
20 THE COURT: Did y o u — e x c u s e me, Counsel. Did you 
21 say long wheelbase? 
22 THE WITNESS: Right. 
23 Q (By Mr. Oliver) What time of the day did this 
24 incident occur? 



























Vi Not uncommon. Are they uncommon on long wheelbase 
two-wheel drive pickup trucks? 
A They're not uncommon on them, either. 
U Officer Mitchell, when you stopped this particular 
pickup truck on this occasion, what was it about this 
particular vehicle that led you to believe, or the occupant 
of this vehicle—was there one or more occupants? 
A Just one occupant. 
Q What was it about the occupant of this vehicle 
that led you to believe that he had broken the law? 
A There wasn't anything about the occupant. It was 
description of his vehicle and where- he was at at the time. 
Q You stopped him solely based u£on the fact that 
it was a long wheelbase two-wheel drive pickup with 
clearance lights? 
A He was coming from the direction of the report and 
the time period would have been exactly right on. 
Q Are there other residents in that direction? 
A Yes. 
Q Approximately how many? 
A Three. 
Q So, there's approximately four residents in that 
general area; is that correct? 
A Yeah. About that many, I think. 
(j Could it have been one of the other residents that 
-t4-
1 I lived in that area? 
2 A No. 
3 U Why? 
4
 A Eecause none of them have vehicles that fit that 
5
 description. 
* G And you knew that, already? 
7
 A Yes. I did. 
8 Q Who are the residents that live down in that area? 
9
 A First resident up that road is Butch—oh, shoot, 
10 you've got me on the spot, I can't think of his name. 
11 Weisner. The other one, used to be the Roses, she renarried, 
12 i donft remember her last name now. Blake Rust lives in 
13 that area. 
14
 Q I'm sorry? 
15
 A Blake Rust. Randy Ghlman lives across the street 
16
 and then there's Johnny 01sen fs. 
17
 k Andy Ohlraan? 
18
 A Randy Ohlroan. 
19
 g Randy Ohlraan? 
20
 A Right. 
21 Q Is Butch's last name ^eisser? 
22
 A VJeisner. 
23 Q Weisner? 
24
 A Uh huh (affirmative). 
25





























And who lives in them? 
One of them belongs to Frank Jessen, the other is— 









What kind of vehicles does Frank Jessen has? 
He has a little white—or a little Jeep pickup and 
a Mercury car. 
Mercury? 
Uh huh (affirmative),. 
Does he have any others? 
Not that I know of. 
And this other car (sic) , that you don't remember 
their name, what kind of cars, do they have, vehicles do 
they have? 
A They have a mid-size Oldsmobile car, he has a 











some more vehicles since then, but that's all that 
of that he had at the time. 
Does anybody live back down this way? 
Yeah. There's—further east—or further south. 
How about this way? 
Like on all roads, there's a house there somewhere, 
if you go far enough. There's houses up that way, 
There are other houses up that way? J 



























Q So, anybody could have been coming from any of 
the houses up this way? 
A It's possible. 
W Anybody could have been coming from the houses 
this way? 
A It's possible. 
Q Or vice versa, the same? They could have been 
coming from this way? 
A They would have had to have been coming— 
Q They could have been company visiting—this 
particular vehicle could have been company, visiting any of 
those houses, could it not? 
A It's possible. 
Q You've indicated that Mr. Lrickson's speech was, 
I believe as you've characterized, careful; is that 
correct? 
A That's correct. 
g And he was trying to control his actions; is that 
correct? 
A That's what it appeared like. 
Q That he was trying to—he was breathing heavy; is 
that correct? 
A No. Ke was breathing heavy, he wasn't trying to. 
Q Well, but he was breathing heavy? 
A Yes. Heavier than normal. 1 
34 1 
1 Q And is that the person seated next to the defense 
2 counsel? 
3 A Yes. 
4 MR. GILLESPIE: Your Honor, if the record could reflect 
5 this witness has also identified the defendant? 
6 THE COURT: Any objections, Counsel? 
7 MR. OLIVER: No objection. 
8 THE COURT: The record may so indicate. 
9 Q (By Mr. Gillespie) What were the circumstances of your 
10 seeing the defendant that evening? 
11 A Just want me to start from the first? 
12 Q If you'd like. 
13 A Okay. I'm a member of the Search & Rescue for Duchesne 
14 County and as such, the sheriff has asked us to be the eyes and 
15 ears in the county for him. And on that night, a call came across 
16 that radio that there was a dispute at the Johnny Olsen residence 
17 in Altona, and the officers that were on duty were approximately 
18 20 to 30 minutes away from the scene. 
19 So, I went out to watch the roads to—according to the 
20 call, someone was leaving the scene, so I went to watch the area 
21 to see which direction the vehicle was going, so that I might be 
22 able to help the officers follow him or chase him down. 
23 Q Okay. Did you see any vehicle leaving the scene? 
24 A I could—I didn't see the vehicle leaving the scene. 
25 I could see clearance lights going up the road, and I went west 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
10 WEST BROADWAY. SUITE 200 8 7 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
1 out of Altamont, to watch the lower end of the area. The caller 
2 from the scene said that the truck was going out on the north 
3 end, so I turned around to go back up the Altona Road to where I 
4 could watch from the north end. 
5 And at that point, Officer Mitchell came on the road 
6 that intersects the road I was on, from his home, he was 
7 approximately a half a mile ahead of me, so I just followed him on 
8 up the road. When I got up—went across the top of the hill that'^ 
9 on the road, he pulled the defendant over, and I pulled up to his 
10 scene, went past both vehicles and got out of my car and came 
11 back. 
12 Q Did you actually see him pull the defendant over? 
13 A No. 
14 Q Okay. And this area where you saw Deputy Mitchell and 
15 the defendant, this would be obvious, but for the record, was that 
16 within Duchesne County? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q And what did you do when you, o r — 
19 A I got out of my car and came back to see if Officer 
20 Mitchell needed any assistance. When I reached him, he gave me 
21 the keys to the defendant's vehicle and said—told the defendant 
22 to—that he was to remain with me. 
23 MR. OLIVER: Objection, your Honor. Objection, this is 
24 hearsay that he's relating now. 
25 MR. GILLESPIE: Your Honor, that's background. 
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